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Transnational Labour Patterns in the Age of Globalisation 
 
 
In his inaugural address to the SSLH in 1960, Asa Briggs criticized the insularity of 
historical scholarship in Britain. Greeting the first issue of the new Society’s Bulletin, 
an anonymous commendation in Past and Present noted: ‘Perhaps this persistent 
insularity is the greatest problem which confronts British labour history. It is to be 
hoped that the new society will help to overcome it.’1 In our last editorial (LHR, 74, 3, 
2009) we described how the society’s conference in 2009 had yielded a great range of 
exciting papers on aspects of transnational labour history. However, we also 
wondered why there had been so few British contributions. Perhaps aspects of the 
insularity lamented by Briggs in 1960 remains an issue half-a-century later. As we 
ponder the nature of labour history in this, the society’s fiftieth anniversary year, we 




The last collection focused on transnational labour connections in the later nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, a period when a combination of migration and 
technological developments facilitated the flow of ideas and people which, in turn, 
underpinned transnational exchange. Transnational ideas, activities and organisations 
intensified in the period 1860s to 1920s with technological, communication and 
transport developments such as trans-oceanic shipping lines, trans-continental railway 
networks, trans-global cable telegraphy, falling printing costs, and the rise of literacy. 
The last set of articles was about a particular phase of transnationalism, what has been 
described as the ‘transnational revolution’, or perhaps that should be described as the 
‘turn of the 20th century’ transnational revolution.2 The December 2009 number 
reinforced what others have shown: that the origins of today’s transnationalism can be 
found in imperial history from the nineteenth century,3 emphasizing the role of 
migratory labour networks in fostering varieties of transnationalism. 
 The present collection focuses on the twentieth century. At this point, the 
impulse towards transnational exchange was driven further by yet more impressive 
technologies; by developments in transport; and by mass media, digital technologies 
and multi-national corporations. These developments were shaped by contingent 
cultural practices and ideologies, including post-colonialism which ultimately 
promoted transnational networks. The present volume, then, focuses on a particular 
phase of transnationalism in the twentieth century.  
Behind these articles is a feeling that the globe shrank in this period and that it 
continues to shrink. As communications’ systems speeded up and became more 
widespread, a ‘transnational consciousness’ also grew apace.4 But does the linking of 
transnationalism to features of modernity lend itself to a new ‘Whig interpretation’? 
We believe these articles suggest otherwise. Common problem faced by all of our 
authors are the checks and constraints upon transnationalism. These articles share a 
degree of scepticism with transnationalism and critically engage with limitations as 
well as possibilities.5 We would argue, therefore that the development of a 
transnational consciousness is neither a linear development nor uniformly positive. 
Transnationalism is a dynamic and evolving process, rather than a ‘thing’ which did 
not develop in one direction.  
 
*** 
We have already defined transnationalism as the flow of people, ideas or commodities 
between nations involving concomitant networks across political borders that are 
maintained over time. Population flows are helpful, but not necessarily crucial, aids to 
transnationalism. Whilst there were persistent and distinct flows of people in the 
twentieth century, the previous volume also alluded to constraints on international 
mobility which were building in the same century. We mentioned how restrictions on 
immigration—in some cases allied to racialist policies of exclusion—limited free 
movement of peoples to Australasia and the United States. In this later period, an 
‘Iron Curtain’ also came down, restricting population movement from Eastern Europe 
and China; post-colonial societies, such as the United Kingdom, regularly altered 
immigration laws in the period after 1945 to limit or alter inward migration flows.  
On the other hand, some regions of free movement have developed such as the 
European Community or Australasia.6 Certainly the numbers of those able to hold 
dual citizenship is increasing.7 Despite restrictions, there are many large movements 
of people: for instance, 37 million Europeans are expatriates in OECD countries, 16.8 
Asian-born, 15.6 million Latin American, 7.1 million African-born, 5.3 million 
Carribean-born, 2.4 million North American and 1.2 million Oceania. Overall, 
however, only three per cent of the world’s population lives in a country in which 
they were not born. Thus we can point to 80 per cent of the United Arab Emirates 
population being foreign-born, 33 per cent of Jordan and Israel, 25 per cent of Arabia, 
23 per cent of Australia and New Zealand respectively; 20 per cent of Singapore and 
18 per cent of Canada and so on. There is ample evidence of both globalization and 
internationalization in world labour markets as well as the pressures of movement 
from poor countries to riche ones. Regardless of laws prevent movement, the post-
1945 period truly has become an age in which migrants and technologies connected 
with identity politics to create a world of many diasporas.  
Similarly in the twentieth century, as in the nineteenth, some nations and 
regions are more likely to be ‘donor’ populations. One of the largest expatriate groups 
is the nearly 9.5 million born in Mexico but living elsewhere, mostly in the United 
States. Yet only 0.5 per cent of the population of Mexico is foreign-born. In the year 
2000, around 24 per cent of Irish-born lived outside Ireland, 16 percent of New 
Zealanders resided beyond their native shores, 13.7 per cent Portuguese and 12.8 per 
cent of Luxembourgers.8 And there are some groups within populations which are 
more likely to migrants, in terms of age, gender and skills. From the longer-term 
perspective selective migration is not a new phenomenon. While transnational 
migration is increasing groups of migrations are joining new configurations or 
patterns of movement during the twentieth compared to the nineteenth century.9 
 The pace and scale and movement leads us towards a view that more people 
are migrants than are not. However, the overwhelming majority of people in the world 
are not transnational, permanently or temporarily.10 Most people in the world live in 
the country in which they were born, even today. The United States, the great 
recipient nation of the nineteenth century, now only has 13 per cent of its population 
born other than in the US.11 Nations do not determine the dynamics of cultural change 
but, spurred on by government policies, a number of transnational groups in the 
nineteenth century have now assimilated.12 
 Some claim that ethnicity is central to transnationalism.13 In part this is 
because transnationalism is often related to population movements or the creation of 
diasporas. In reality, the relationship is not so simple. Transnationalism can involve a 
certain exchange between networks across national borders that does not involve large 
population movement in itself.14 Thus labour historians have considered the effects of 
industrialization, which originated in parts of the United Kingdom and spread to other 
similar areas on the continent. Arguably the ideas and technologies flowed even more 
readily than migrants. During the Industrial Revolution, nodes of industrialism, rather 
than whole industrial nations, became linked through networks of technology and 
trade to an extent which was more important than the migratory labour flows which 
accompanied capital movements.  
While transitory and transient populations have promoted interconnectivity 
between peoples, ideas, movements and institutions can be independently 
transnational. The diffusion of the welfare state and its subsequent downsizing 
occurred with little population movement. Yet the ideas behind both its rise and 
reduction flowed easily enough across national borders. The rise of social democratic 
parties is an example of ideological transfer considered in this volume. Some 
examples are more complex: the fall of the Eastern Bloc and the formation of the 
European Union have been held to have promoted transnationalism.15  
 The movement of people, ideas and commodities is not new. Slavery and 
evangelical religion are two examples of persistent movements: the first shifting 
people against their will; the other promoting Christianity as an adjunct of Empire.16 
In geopolitics, ideological transnationalism lurches towards simply international 
exchange, thus perhaps undermining any notion that transnationalism will become the 
hegemonic control for understanding all exchanges of this type. We can see this in 
international affairs, where transfers of power or ideas require neither mass 
population movements nor the triumph of one belief system over another.17 
Environmentalist tendencies around the problem of global warming provide another 
example in which governments are acting inter- rather than trans-nationally.18 The 
same might not be said for the climate-change protestors who have formed 
international networks to voice their opinions by pursuing government officials 
around the world at G8 summits. 
 Some ideas and institutions have moved more widely than others but few 
movements are truly global. Moreover, the facilitation of ideas and commodities has 
developed so much in the last century that there are now many sources for ideas and 
commodities, not simply from Europe or the US or from East to West. In population 
terms, this has been described as ‘super-diversity’.19 In terms of transnationalism, it is 
relatively easily to see the effects of super-diversity in, for example, individual 
biography and at the national level transnational labour networks between Australia 
and Britain in the late nineteenth century. But the same observations are more 
difficult in the dizzying context of twentieth-century diversity. We believe there are 
patterns. Labour historians need to turn to recovering them.  
 
*** 
A number of cultural practices and ideologies have governed transnationalism and 
will continue to do so. The papers here put the spotlight on at least three kinds of 
geopolitical or ideological forces mediating transnationalism: city or place; regional 
cultural institutions established prior to the nation; and nationalism itself. The articles 
which follow, rather than focusing on particular transnational networks, are all 
intrinsically comparative.  
 
 John Belchem emphasizes place. His essay focuses on the city and port of 
Liverpool, that hub of British, Irish and indeed European interactions with the wider 
world. The setting has been explored most fully and recently in Belchem’s own 
remarkable study of the Irish in Liverpool.20 His case-study of the Liverpool Irish, 
whose connections and comparisons with Irish communities elsewhere in the world, 
notably the United States, provides a critical test-bed for the application of 
transnational theory to historical research. Belchem begins by lamenting that he has 
tried to incorporate recent best practice in transitional history into his research on 
Liverpool, without always being successful.  
The first part of Belchem’s article offers a thoroughgoing overview of recent 
historiography. For him, it is a problem that the Liverpool Irish have been portrayed 
as the ‘scum’ of the Irish Diaspora, the lowest of the low. Whilst some of the convict 
Irish who went to the Australian colonies may have questioned this designation for 
the Irish in Liverpool, the latter nevertheless suffered from extraordinarily negative 
external images, which, in turn, shaped a defiant, alienated self-image. It seems 
plausible to suggest that the tensions created around the images of the Irish in the city 
also went on to influence Liverpool’s popular culture more broadly and to encourage 
a culture of defiance within the city. The city thus consciously views itself as 
different.  
Within a historiography heavily influenced by Irish-American scholarship, the 
Irish in Britain more generally are considered to be the least fortunate of Ireland’s 
millions of free migrants. Unlike those who fled to America, the Irish in Britain 
continued to languish in thrall of the British state, too poor and downtrodden to 
emancipate themselves fully from the circumstances which had led to their flight in 
the first place. As the pre-eminent scholar of Irish emigration writes, ‘For hordes of 
Irish deck passengers disembarking at Liverpool, Bristol, or the Clyde, Britain was 
seldom the desired or promised land.’21 Ruth-Anne goes further; for her, as for 
commentators at the time, Britain was nothing more than ‘the nearest place that 
wasn’t Ireland.’22 If this was true for the Irish in Britain, it was yet truer still of the 
Irish in Liverpool. The great port city was the first footfall for the largest portion of 
the Irish who left Ireland and a major processor of re-emigrants who went onto the 
New World from there. 
 Belchem, however, holds out for a different vision of the Irish of Liverpool. 
The Irish in Belchem’s Liverpool were not simply passing through. They were were 
there to stay. He suggests the need for a model that takes account of the lack of 
assimilation of the Liverpool Irish over time: ‘a multi-generational study of migrant 
communities’ in which the Liverpool Irish eschewed the ‘narrative ethic of individual 
material advancement in favour of the communality, solidarity and charity benefits 
available only at the bottom of the social, but not the spiritual, scale’ (p.XX). In 
proposing his schema, Belchem strikes a cautionary note about transnationalism. In 
his narrative, it is the specificity of the Liverpool Irish, rather than then their 
comparability with other Irish or non-Irish groups, which has the greatest implications 
for labour history. Rather than ‘class, confessional or gaelic alternatives, such as 
Labour Party, the Catholic Federation or Sinn Fein’ the Irish National Party of Austin 
Harford ‘was the hegemonic political force in Edwardian Irish Liverpool’. The Nat-Labs 
rather than the Lib-Labs were in the ascendancy, while ‘the terms Irish, Catholic and 
working-class had acquired synonymic force, strengthened in opposition to secular 
(often middle-class) socialism’ (p.??). 
 The case of the Irish in Liverpool raises more generic questions about 
assumptions over the diffusion of ideas or issues of translation that necessarily occur 
as ideas, narratives and models travel and are implemented across national 
boundaries. Belchem is asking, in effect, can macro and transnational developments 
such as the concept of an Irish Diaspora really be conflated with a more micro-level 
understanding of transnational history?23 
 
*** 
Our authors also put the spotlight is also put on regional cultural institutions that have 
mediated the imposition and introduction of more recent national ones in this college. 
We are reminded here that many nations were established relatively recently: Italy in 
1861, Australia in 1901, Norway, disconnected from Sweden in 1905, Canada in 
1910, and so on. Natasha Vall explores the transition from voluntaristic to state-led 
cultural provision after 1945 with the emergence in Britain of the Arts Council and its 
regional representatives, assessing those against Swedish and German counterparts. In 
her article we see some of the differences in levels of regionalism and in variant 
notions of the nation, new and old.  
Fitting into wider European trends at the time, organisations in the UK, such 
as Arts Council and regional versions or variants, tried to develop widespread access 
to culture—but not working-class cultures, such as football and popular cinema, but 
middle-brow aspects of music and art. Vall offers an exercise in comparative regional 
history, focusing not upon the metropolitan zones of various European countries, but 
instead by alighting on three important industrial areas, each of them places of heavy 
manual work and traditional industrial working-class communities: North East 
England, Skåne in Sweden, and, to a lesser extent, the Ruhr in Germany. The fulcrum 
of her examination is the balance between the perpetuation of existing regional 
institutions of culture and the attempts to impose or introduce national versions. 
Vall’s article demonstrates how, in the post-WWII period, there was a desire to give 
the working class more than better wages and conditions; moreover, the evolution of 
cultural policy aimed at the working classes chimed with the wider enlarging of the 
state, which was a feature of the post-war settlement. Yet haziness around definitions 
of culture emerge: is culture about making higher forms available at cheaper prices; 
does it laud indigenous, working-class art; or is a combination of the two? Certainly, 
Mary Glasgow, one of the main actors discussed by Vall, was very concerned that 
state/middle-class intervention in the arts might either deprive workers of a role or 
‘undermine didactic ambitions’ (p.XX). The zeal and interventionism of arts brokers 
in the post-war north east of England—where Vall tells us elite arts patronage was 
historical weak—even stretched as far as a concern with how to introduce arts 
(presumably meaning higher forms of art) to workingmen’s clubs. Since the Club and 
Institute Union had been reborn against middle-class control the desire, though 
perhaps noble, was at least naive.24 
Vall examines the concern over the cultural deficit of the industrial working 
class expressed by leading figures in the new arena of cultural policy, Glasgow and 
Lord Keynes. Drawing upon research from the North East Association for the Arts 
(established in 1961), which maintained links with the North East’s political and 
economic establishment, her article explores the experience of such metropolitan 
cultural imperatives in the Labour stronghold of north-east England. It also seeks to 
examine how far a civic concern to improve popular cultural sensibilities after 1945 
was peculiar to British cultural policy. It asks whether there were similar movements 
to realise the improvement of working-class culture in comparable European regions, 
and considers the possibilities for a comparative or transnational approach to the 
history of European cultural policy during the twentieth century. She argues that 





A number of the articles emphasize the role of nationalism upon potentially 
transnational developments. Despite attempts being made to organise labour 
internationally, European workers and their unions, it seems, preferred to work in 
national contexts and feared that the internationalization of labour organisations 
would undermine local/national structures. While examining different nations, none 
of the articles assumes that transnationalism is always a positive force in history or 
historiography. Several authors consider the extent to which the nation-state retained 
its importance as the primary ‘identity space’ and the repercussions this has had for 
transnationalism. 
 Whilst dealing with quite different material in the Danish-US linkages, Sissel 
Bjerum Fossat’s article shares many similarities with Vall’s on the interactions of 
governments, agencies and the working class around the provision of culture. Certain 
connections also exist to Belchem’s work. If he considers the natural comparisons 
between the Irish in Liverpool and in America through the filter of some of the latest 
thinking on Diaspora and comparative ethnic history, Fossat examines a more 
contained or specific flow of communication between America and Europe: the ways 
in which Danish society was influenced by the successes of post-war American 
consumer capitalism. She examines the interplay between Danish desires, on the one 
hand, for American standards of living and, on the other, their pride in Danish social 
security and welfare provision—a safety net they considered superior to America’s. 
The current debate in the United States around universal health care and current 
Republican denigration of the UK’s National Health Service, as part of their assault 
on Barak Obama’s welfare mission, makes this article particularly topical.  
In the aftermath of World War II, Danes also admired Marshall Plan America 
as a model of modernity. American politicians, businessmen and others made their 
way across the Atlantic to help with reconstruction and to spread the gospel according 
to American free market economics. As they travelled in one direction, Danish trade 
unionists and socialists were funded to make numerous study visits to the US in order 
to be imbued with the America sense of labour relations: a spirit of cooperation 
between workers and management was stressed at the expense of transformative, 
socialist principles. Whilst the Danes took away answers about how to go forward in 
peace-time, they also imbibed their own lessons on what not to do, rejecting aspects 
of American culture and practice. ‘We have much to learn’ was one of the 
conclusions of a group of Danish trade unionist who had been on a study visit to the 
US. The high standard of living the group had seen during their stay impressive the 
European onlookers. American workers could afford TVs, cars and luxury goods, 
things the average Dane could only dream about. Still, when it came to social security 
and welfare, the Danes were ahead. 
 Fossat’s article clearly articulates something quite different from the articles in 
our first collection in that here we see the governments and official agencies of the US 
and Denmark interacting around reconstruction. The travelling democrats who 
investigated the American way of life were themselves official, in terms of 
representing unions, parties and the like. This was a much more robust, organised and 
organisational transnational interconnection than had been apparent prior to World 
War I.  But nationalism or Danish pride governed the transnationalism of postwar 
American consumer capitalism. Fossat shows how Danish trade unions ‘negotiated, 
accepted, rejected and changed’ American ideas. 
Social movements, non-trade union political struggles, single-issue pressure 
groups, politicised charities, and a plethora of others gleaned international support by 
showing awareness of non-national frameworks of communication.  Even before the 
internet (which has further radicalised communications), real-time TV, or quickly-
relayed recordings allowed mass media to bring movements, such as that against 
South African Apartheid, or events, such as Tiannamen Square (1989), to our living 
rooms with great rapidity. 
One of the best, long-living campaigns emerged in Poland in the 1980s. The 
struggle of Polish trade union, Solidarność (Solidarity), led by Lech Walesa, captured 
the imagination of trades’ unionists, political activists, and others who raised money 
for their Polish brethren. But the movement’s main actors, its various strikes and 
protests, and the actions of its major enemy, General Jaruzelski, were headline news 
items with which ordinary people became familiarised. As Idesbald Goddeeris argues, 
however, the reception of Solidarity was patchy across the world. Whilst Solidarity 
was, to use Benedict Anderson notable phrase, a ‘global imagined community’,25 not 
all states were equal members of that community. French and Italians, in particular, 
forged mass movements in support of the Poles. The ICFTU, WCL and the ILO were 
consistently supportive. However, Britain and Germany (to name but two) were much 
less supportive.  
 Indeed, labour organisations seem to behave in a less transnational, less 
global, way than equivalent social movements. Why did a social democratic 
movement like Solidarność behave less transnationally than a new social movement 
like anti-apartheid? At first appearances the differences between the two movements 
might be thought to be result from timing. The anti-apartheid movement began earlier 
in 1956 two and a half decades before Solidarność. Goddeeris suggests that the 
differences lie in the nature of the movements, what is described as ‘transnationalism 
from above’ and ‘transnationalism from below’. The anti-apartheid movement is 
described as a new social movement establishing grassroots networks, organisations 
and collective action, the legacy of which had resonances for the contemporary 
protest against globalization, neo-liberalism and apathy over climate change. It was 
‘transnationalism from below’. The western response to Solidarność movement from 
the summer of 1980, however, was more structured, formal and institutionalised, led 
by the labour movement, much more varied and less multinational transnationalism. It 
was transnationalism from above.  The development of a formal structure hampered 
the rise of transnational labour solidarity at the lower levels, as occurred in the more 
mass groundswell of anti-apartheid. Internationalism in the case of Solidarność then 
did not lead to a ‘multi-cultural grassroots transnational consciousness’ because of the 
extent of its institutionalisation.  
As Goddeeris skilfully reveals, the different levels of support reflected 
national political cultures and so reduced the transnational potentiality of what 
potentially was a model transnational movement.26 National differences also meant a 
varied range of bilateral national reactions developed in support to Solidarność. 
Apartheid was removed from the struggle against communism in the twentieth 
century Europe while Solidarność was from within and contested. A greater division 
of opinion obstructed solidarity across Western borders over Solidarność. There were 
fundamental differences between the East-West and North-South which proved an 
obstacle to multi-national transnationalism. 
The first volume of articles on transnational history (LHR, 74, 3, 2009) 
focused on instances of extra-national activity which were, to some degree, specialist 
and organic. Whilst we argued that this collection suggested a much earlier start to the 
history of globalisation than would once have been mooted, we also recognise that the 
twentieth century was a crucible for inter-, trans-, and cross-national activities under 
the banner of labour. It is an old adage in the history of labour relations that some 
activists believed workers must internationalise their organisations and their struggles 
in the face of the internationalisation of capitalism.  
In a rigorous, persuasive and detailed study of cross-border union activity in 
the automobile industry, Thomas Fetzer argues that it was in the 1950 and 1960s that 
clear signs of this type of activity first emerged. In highlighting the cases of Ford and 
General Motors, Fetzer moves against the suggestion that these early forms of 
‘national internationalism’ were inferior to later forms of transnational activity. Yet 
he describes vividly the attempts which were made by unions to create international 
solidarity or at least international coordination, and the efforts of employers to scotch 
such developments. He also brings to light the restrictive, nationalist viewpoints of 
many in the trade union movement. The result is a rich article which covers enormous 
ground, by country, union and dispute; an interesting evocation of the difference trade 
union cultures of, for example, Britain and German, measured, in one instance in the 
later 1970s, by British unionists’ attempts ‘to convert their German counterparts to the 
UK brand of trade unionism’ (p.XX). If such enterprises had their roots in earlier 
times, the progress of multi-national companies, and the recent near-collapse of the 
world finance system, has meant that, since the 1990s, transnational engagements of 
labour have become more urgent and relevant than ever. 
 Whilst the transnational movements which were discussed in LHR 74, 3 were 
mostly either discrete or specialist—a factor explained partly by the nature of 
communications’ networks in the later nineteenth century—the movements which 
grabbed our attention in the post-war period were far more apparent to much larger 
audiences. Clearly, the advances in communications also enable the high degree of 
mobility and discussion which was behind the regular and complicated series of 
exchanges which Fetzer described in the global car industry. But there were other 
instances too. 
 Melanie Nolan’s article visits one of the most interesting features of labour 
politics in the post-war period: the emergence of ‘Third Way’ politics. Her focus is 
upon New Zealand and the extent to which, during the 1980s, the ministries of the 
Labour Prime Minister, David Lange and of Geoffrey Palmer, and particularly of 
Lange’s Finance Minister, Roger Douglas, transformed the country’s political 
landscape and essentially drew a line under the socialist essence of the New Zealand 
Labour Party. But this was in the 1980s. Elsewhere in the world, right-wing parties 
were delivering in vehicles, such as Thatcherism or Reaganism, cuts, reforms, 
reductions in the social state and welfare services, deregulation and privatisation. But 
in New Zealand, Labour delivered these objectives.  
Later, New Zealand’s ‘Third Way’ followed Clinton and Blair, but not simply 
by aping them. The New Zealand Labour Party, which under Helen Clark won three 
elections between 1999 and 2009, also picked up the ideas of Anthony Giddens, the 
thinker most credited with Britain’s ‘New Labour’. As Nolan shows, the New 
Zealand Labour Party went through the stages of development associated more 
generally with the rise of such parties across the world, delivering socialist and statist 
programmes around health, education, nationalisation and welfare generally. The drift 
away from ‘First’ and ‘Second’ way labourism was a general one in global social 
democracy; yet it was especially attuned in New Zealand. Whilst Antipodean 
commentators have regularly drawn analogies between British and Australian Labour 
Parties, Nolan is correct to assert that such comparisons are incomplete without the 
case of the New Zealand Labour Party. After all, Helen Clark was very much part of 
the ‘Third Way’ club, receiving invitations to various international forums which 
examined ‘Third Way’ political approaches.27  
Nolan is arguing, in effect, that scholars have missed key components of 
nations’ political histories by taking a nation-centered approach and by ignoring the 
transnational flow of ideas and actors. The significance of various strategies or 
programmes, such as social democracy, cannot be grasped by focusing on the nation-
state alone. In the contemporary context, the opening of labour history to present 
debates regarding transnationalism, networks, and other dimensions of globalization 
will enable us to engage in a fruitful dialogue with scholars outside of New Zealand 
who explore similar issues from their particular angle. While Belchem resists a 
transnational perspective because of its limitations, Nolan embraces it despite them. 
 
*** 
Finally, it would seem that all of the articles here are about the effects of what we 
term the ‘locality impact’ on transnational forces and networks. Place, nation, and 
region mediate transnational forces, though the effect is not only one-way, albeit not 
always reciprocal.28 The authors here seem to agree about non-national dynamics of 
their particular areas of interest but still stress the importance of the national unit of 
enquiry. The likeliest conclusion, therefore, is an appeal to engage sub-national, 
national and extra-national factors in a continuing dialogue. The effect, we believe, 
would be to emancipate each level of analysis without incarcerating the others. 
International identities have long co-existed with national identities. This volume 
offers a new perspective on national as well as transnational history. More than that, it 
also leads us to think of transnationalism as not a simply deterministic phenomenon: 
we accept that is a site of conflict, especially between transnational influences within 
the social, political and cultural arenas of the nation-state (or supra or sub national 
groupings).29 Shelley Fisher Fishkin's term ‘crossroads’—by which she means 
constant sites of exchange—is useful in this regard. The place, nation or region should 
be considered a crossroads where the multi-directional exchanges between national 
and transnational forces are played out.30 
Each of the articles in this collection considers different aspects of what is a 
complex, interwoven blend of ideology, activity, organisation and individual, spread 
across countries and continents. It is undoubtedly easier for labour to express 
transnationalism ideological sympathy, or to make donations to a cause across 
national boundaries, than it is successfully to create a durable system of cooperation 
between institutions of labour. Fetzer’s article contrasts with the others in this respect, 
since his subject matter is the attempt by workers to form consistent and persistent 
frameworks for addressing employers on the level of the trade union negotiator whilst 
doing it internationally. What we learn from all the contributors, though, is that 
among the noble aims and the durable structures which emerged in labour movements 
and were promoted in transnational networks, there are also many instances of local 
and nationalist thinking among workers, their unions, communities and parties. 
Despite all the forces intensifying transnationalism, Fetzer warns against ‘a reading of 
events as heralding a new age of labour transationalism destined to overcome union 
parochialism’. It is not the case that the new era of transnational labour is well beyond 
the ‘national internationalism’ of the past. There is an increased mutual inter-
dependence between labour movements which are still nationally defined. 
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